


TANZANIA ELECTION MONITORING COMMITTEE

TEMCO



REDET - LEAD AGENCY OF TEMCO

**INTERIM STATEMENT ON OBSERVATION OF UPDATING OF THE
PERMANENT NATIONAL VOTERS' REGISTER**

MARCH 2020

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ABRREVIATIONS

ACT-Wazalendo	-	Action for Change and Transparency-Wazalendo
ARO	-	Assistant Registration Officer
BVR	-	Biometric Voter Register
CCM	-	Chama cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	-	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
CUF	-	Civic United Front
DC	-	District Council
ID	-	Identity Card
IT	-	Information Technology
LGA	-	Local Government Area
MC	-	Municipal Council
NCCR-Mageuzi	-	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi
NEC	-	National Electoral Commission
PNVR	-	Permanent National Voters' Register
PWD	-	People with Disabilities
RO	-	Registration Officer
TEMCO	-	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee

1. INTRODUCTION

This is an interim statement on the observation of Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) of the updating of registration of voters in the Permanent National Voters' Register (PNVR) undertaken by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Article 74 (6) of the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania has entrusted NEC with the responsibility of supervising and coordinating the registration of voters in Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilors' elections in the United Republic. The exercise of updating the PNVR is a crucial preparatory phase for the forthcoming general elections to be held in October 2020. The updating process involved four main activities, namely registration of first time applicants who have reached the age of 18 years and those who would attain that age by October 2020. Second, it involved voters who had moved into new areas of residence who wished to transfer their registration details. It also provided an opportunity for voters whose cards have been damaged or lost to get new cards. Finally, the updating process involved removing from the PNVR names of voters who had become ineligible, such as the deceased.

The process of updating the PNVR has been completed in 26 regions of Tanzania Mainland and 5 regions of Zanzibar since the official launching of the exercise in Kilimanjaro region on 18 July 2019. Pursuant to provision 40 (1) of Regulations for Updating of the PNVR (GN. 792 and 793 published on 28 December, 2018) and provision 42 (1) of the Local Authorities Updating of the PNVR Regulations of 2018, NEC extended invitation to TEMCO to observe the exercise of updating the PNVR. TEMCO's observation of the process of updating the PNVR commenced on 1st December 2019 and covered 89 Local Government Authorities (LGAs) in 16 regions of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar.

The statement, therefore, covers 16 regions of Tanzania, including five of Zanzibar, 89 LGAs and 614 voter registration centres. The statement is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The second part addresses methodological issues. The third section covers voter education. The fourth section is devoted to recruitment and training of voter registration officials. The voter registration process is covered in the fifth section. The sixth section provides conclusions and recommendations.

2. METHODOLOGY

Between 1st December 2019 and 18th January 2020 TEMCO deployed a total of 89 observers covering 614 registration centers in 89 LGAs across 16 regions of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar. On 7th February, 2020, NEC Chair, Retired Judge Semistocles Kaijage, notified participants of elections stakeholders meeting in Dar es Salaam that the Commission increased the number of registration centers for Dar es Salaam region from 1,614 (of 2015) to 1,661. This is an increase of 47 registration centers. Judge Kaijage

also noted that the number of registration centers for the entire country has been increased from 36,549 to 37, 407.

NEC carried out the exercise of updating the PNVR in phases, covering a cluster of regions or zones at a time. TEMCO's deployment plan (see Appendix I), henceforth, followed NEC's phased process which was divided into five main zones, namely:

- (i) Central Zone: Dodoma (1 region);
- (ii) Coastal Zone: Dar er Salaam, Pwani, Morogoro, and Tanga (4 regions);
- (iii) Southern Zone: Lindi, Mtwara and Ruvuma (3 regions);
- (iv) Southern Highlands Zone: Iringa, Mbeya, and Njombe (3 regions); and
- (v) Zanzibar Zone: Kaskazini Pemba, Kaskazini Unguja, Kusini Pemba, Kusini Unguja and Mjini Magharibi (5 regions).

While in the field each TEMCO observer was equipped with an observation checklist to observe two phases of the updating of the voter register for the 2020 elections. First, the observation of the pre-registration activities for a period of three days leading up to the registration period was done. The pre-registration activities checklist included questions on voter education activities, training of voter registration officials and the general environment in which voter registration took place. The pre-registration checklist was reported on the third day of observation, on the eve of the actual voter registration exercise in an LGA.

Second, TEMCO undertook observation of the voters' registration process during the official seven days set out by NEC. For this phase, TEMCO observers covered registration centres within their LGA of deployment, one center every day from 8:00 a.m. until closing time. Observers were required to submit daily reports for each registration centre observed. The voter registration centres checklist included questions on the set up process, voter registration procedures and closing of the voter registration centres.

Additionally, TEMCO observers transmitted critical incident reports in real time to the TEMCO database. TEMCO observers reported both on events that they observed directly/ witnessed and events that they observed indirectly/ heard of from a credible third party. Reports from secondary sources were verified using a four-step process. First, TEMCO observers assessed whether the source of the information is reliable, credible and objective. Second, the observers evaluated the plausibility of the reported event. Third, observers sought to corroborate the report with other sources whether media, other citizens or registration officials. Lastly, and if possible, TEMCO observers were encouraged to gather physical evidence to support their reports. Although indirectly observed, such information should be understood to be qualitatively different from directly observed reports. However, receiving such information from sources enabled TEMCO observers to

provide a more comprehensive picture of events taking place in their LGAs during each reporting period.

All TEMCO observers were duly accredited by NEC and were taken through a rigorous two-day election observation training on the voter registration laws and regulations, nonpartisan observer code of conduct, understanding the observation checklists and reporting protocols.

3. VOTER EDUCATION

Reports from TEMCO observers for the 89 observed LGAs indicate that the exercise of providing voter education was conducted generally in a peaceful environment. No acts of harassment or intimidation of voter educators were reported. All observers neither witnessed nor heard of any acts of attacks on, intimidation or harassment of voter educators, registration officials or civil society organizations. Also, TEMCO observers did not witness nor hear of any gender-based violence, confiscation or destruction of voter IDs. Provision 4C of the National Elections Act (CAP 343 Revised Editions of 2015) has entrusted NEC with the responsibility of providing voters' education as well as coordinating and supervising institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and persons who conduct such education throughout the United Republic. In exercising this mandate, NEC endorsed the involvement of 12 out of 28 CSOs that had applied for permission to provide voters' education. However, very few of the permitted CSOs provided voters' education, apparently partly due to resource constraints. The overwhelming majority of TEMCO observers (91 percent) indicated that voter education activities were conducted by NEC. As seen in Table 3.1, very few observers (21 percent) reported that they heard of such activities by CSOs in their LGAs. The criteria used by NEC in accrediting applicants for voters' education provision include:

- (i) Possession of valid registration certificate/documents (official credentials) according to the relevant laws of the country;
- (ii) A minimum of six months of operations since date of registration for the organization;
- (iii) Two of the organization's chief executive members must be Tanzanians;
- (iv) The organization ought not to have history of breaching peace or inciting chaos;
and
- (v) Readiness to provide voters' education at own cost.

Table 3.1: Provision of Voter Education

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes, witnessed (%)</i>	<i>Yes, heard of (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Have you witnessed or heard of any voter education activities conducted by NEC in your LGA?	32 (36)	49 (55)	8 (9)	89 (100)
Have you witnessed or heard of any voter education activities conducted by civil society organizations (CSOs) in your LGA?	0 (0)	19 (21)	70 (79)	89 (100)

It was also observed that participation by political parties in the provision of voter education was relatively low. TEMCO observers witnessed mostly CCM leaders and/or cadres and to a far less extent CHADEMA being involved in mobilizing and sensitizing voters to register (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Involvement of Political Parties in Mobilizing Voters to Register

<i>No voter education by parties (%)</i>	<i>CCM (%)</i>	<i>CHADEMA (%)</i>	<i>CUF (%)</i>	<i>ACT-Wazalendo (%)</i>	<i>NCCR-Mageuzi (%)</i>	<i>Other (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
57 (64)	30 (34)	17 (19)	7 (8)	6 (7)	2 (2)	1 (1)	89 (100)

Citizens' turnout for voters' education was very low. As shown in Table 3.3, very few TEMCO observers (12%) reported that the voter registration education activities were well attended by citizens while 35% reported a moderate attendance.

Table 3.3: Citizens Turnout for Voters' Education

<i>To what extent were voter registration education activities attended by citizens?</i>						
<i>No voter education activities attended (%)</i>	<i>No one attended (%)</i>	<i>Poorly attended (%)</i>	<i>Moderately attended (%)</i>	<i>Well attended (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>	
41 (46)	0 (0)	6 (7)	31 (35)	11 (12)	89 (100)	

As shown in Table 3.4, NEC used a variety of methods to disseminate voter education information to the public. Slightly over a half of TEMCO observers (53%) reported the use of radio adverts to disseminate information on voter registration education by NEC/ZEC, demonstrating how radios are more accessible to citizens (especially in rural

areas) than other media. Apart from radio adverts, the commission also made use of TV adverts, leaflets and brochures, video vans, newspaper adverts, civic trainings in areas which attract large crowds like markets and bus stands, and social media platforms.

Table 3.4: Methods used to Disseminate Voters’ Education by NEC

<i>What methods were used by NEC to disseminate voter education? (Tick all that apply)</i>									
<i>No voter education by NEC (%)</i>	<i>Leaflets/ Brochures (%)</i>	<i>Newspaper Adverts (%)</i>	<i>Radio Advert (%)</i>	<i>T.V. Advert (%)</i>	<i>Social Media (%)</i>	<i>Video Vans (%)</i>	<i>Civic trainings (%)</i>	<i>Other (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
10 (11)	19 (21)	12 (13)	47 (53)	24 (27)	9 (10)	9 (18)	12 (13)	46 (52)	89 (100)

Noticeably, NEC had intensified its voter education strategy via the social media, particularly Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook. Updates and relevant information on the ongoing process of updating the PNVR were uploaded into these platforms in a timely manner. This is a welcome strategy which apart from improving the Commission’s visibility, helped to build trust among eligible voters and other electoral stakeholders as activities were executed in a transparent manner. More importantly, NEC reached a significant portion of eligible voters, i.e. youth, who mostly use social media platforms than any other category of the general population.

NEC recognized the necessity and importance of participation of special groups (i.e. women, youth, PWDs, vulnerable groups, and those who cannot read and write) and actually devised voters’ education tools and materials exclusively for such groups. However, as shown in Table 3.5, slightly over half of our observers reported to have either witnessed or heard of voter education activities aimed at enhancing participation of special groups, i.e. women (51%); youth (52%) and People with Disabilities (PWDs) (50%) (see Table 3.5).

Table 3.5: Voter Education Targeting Special Groups

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes, witnessed (%)</i>	<i>Yes, heard of (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Have you witnessed or heard of any voter education activities aimed at enhancing women participation in your LGA?	6 (7)	39 (44)	44 (49)	89 (100)
Have you witnessed or heard of any voter education activities aimed at enhancing youth participation in your LGA?	7 (8)	39 (44)	43 (48)	89 (100)
Have you witnessed or heard of any voter education activities aimed at enhancing PWDs participation in your LGA?	6 (7)	38 (43)	45 (51)	89 (100)

TEMCO also inquired on the adequacy of voter education provided by NEC and generally found it to be inadequate. Public address vans were useful only to people who reside close to the major roads where they passed. In some LGAs, as the information was being relayed at the last minute, the van drove through hurriedly with the full message hardly reaching the intended audience. It was also noted that people had very little chance to ask questions and seek clarifications. It was observed that NEC did not set aside sufficient funds to enable provision of voter education. In some LGAs it was noted that the Returning Officers had to hire some young men paying them 3,000 or 5,000 shillings to go around with a drum to urge people to turn up for registration. In Kilindi TEMCO observed a unique way of providing voter education as the registration officer designed brochures which were distributed to primary and secondary school students. This method seemed to have worked enabling the intended message to reach many people.

4. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF REGISTRATION OFFICIALS

NEC recruited and trained registration officials in each LGAs observed. In each LGA, NEC recruited sufficient officials in tandem with the number of registration centres. In most cases each registration centre was required to have at least two officials: the BVR Kit Operator and the Assistant Registration Officer. This had an advantage as it rationalized the distribution of personnel although TEMCO found that justification could be made to increase this number of officials, especially in heavily populated areas where voter registration officers were overwhelmed.

4.1 Recruitment of Registration Officials

The majority of TEMCO observers (70%) reported that most of the recruited officials were public servants. Registration officials for different levels (i.e. regional and ward levels) were appointed by NEC according to sections 7A (1) and 8 (1 & 2) of the Acts. No. 13 of 2004 and No. 8 of 1995, respectively, by virtue of their positions. These are city, municipal, town and district directors and Ward Executive Officers. However, as shown in Table 4.1 in Zanzibar TEMCO observers noted that most registration officials were not public servants but were rather recruited in their personal capacity.

Table: 4.1 Registration Officials who are Public Servants

<i>Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar</i>	<i>Few (%)</i>	<i>Most (%)</i>	<i>All (%)</i>	<i>No Information (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Registration officials who are public servants (Mainland)	8 (10)	60 (76)	5 (6)	6 (8)	79 (100)

Registration officials who are public servants (Zanzibar)	6 (60)	2 (20)	1 (10)	1 (10)	10 (100)
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Reports from TEMCO observers also indicated that relatively few women and PWDs were recruited as BVR Kit Operators. In most cases recruitment was based on a person’s ability and required qualifications, depending on recruitment interviews that were conducted.

4.2 Training of Registration Officials

Trainers from NEC were deployed to LGAs to conduct training for Regional Registration Coordinators, Registration Officers (ROs), Assistant Registration Officers (AROs) and IT officers. At ward level, ROs conducted training for AROs. The ROs were assisted by AROs at council level. AROs at ward level in turn conducted training to Voter Registration Officers at registration centre level and BVR Kit Operators.

The training covered laws and regulations governing the registration of voters, including filling Form Number 1 for registering new applicants/voters; Form Number 5A for filling application to transfer/correct voter registration details/lost or destroyed voter ID; and Form Number 5B for erasing voter registration details. They were also trained on identification of eligible voters, how to operate BVR Kits, rights of voters, observers and party agents.

80 TEMCO observers (90%) reported that training for voter registration officials was conducted for two days. Only 8 observers (i.e. 9%) noted that training took place for more than two days. Most of the training sessions took place in classroom settings (as reported by 84 observers, i.e. 94%). Other methods employed include practicing using equipment, one-on-one training, training manuals, and few role plays (as reported by 20 observers, i.e. 22%). The second day of training was specifically for practical exercises on how to operate the BVR Kit.

Table 4.2 Permission to Observe Training for Registration Officials

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Were you permitted to observe at the centre?	83 (93)	6 (7)	89 (100)

As shown in Table 4.2, all of TEMCO observers were permitted to observe training of registration officials with the exception of observers for Njombe DC, Mbinga MC, Songea MC, Songea DC, Tandahimba DC, Nyasa DC, Mbinga DC, Iringa DC, Ludewa DC and Chake Chake in Zanzibar, who were asked not to attend day one training sessions. They were told by the respective registration officers that observers were not allowed to attend those sessions. However, they were allowed to attend day two training sessions after communication between TEMCO Secretariat and NEC headquarters.

5. VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS

Having established themselves in the field and having observed the pre-registration activities, including the provision of voters' education, recruitment and training of registration officials, TEMCO observers set out to observe the actual voter registration process. Most importantly, TEMCO was keen to observe the duration of the registration per LGA, time of opening and closing of voter registration centres, the general environment at the registration centres, competency of registration personnel and security arrangements.

5.1 Opening of Registration Centres and Adequacy of Materials

Voter registration was undertaken for seven days in each LGA with the exception of Dar es Salaam where due to a large number of unregistered voters by the last day, NEC extended the exercise for three days to clear the backlog. Each registration centre was supposed to open at 8.00 am and close at 6.00 pm. For the most part this arrangement was followed.

Table 5.1 Opening of Registration Centres

<i>What time did the registration centre open?</i>				
By 8:00 am (%)	8:00 am-10:00am (%)	Between 10.00am and 12.00 noon (%)	After 12:00 Noon (%)	Total (%)
476 (78)	137 (22)	1 (0)	0 (0)	614 (100)

Out of the 613 registration centres observed, 476 (78 percent) opened on time, that is at exactly 8.00 am. The remaining 137 (22 percent) opened between 8.00 am and 10.00 am (See Table 5.1).

Cases of late opening were few such as the one reported at Majengo center in Mbeya where the BVR Kit operator arrived 10 minutes late, claiming to the ARO Kata that it was because of the heavy traffic jam on the way, caused by soldiers who were doing exercises in the ward. However, this did not interrupt the registration exercise since no one had appeared for registration by that time. This particular official was reprimanded and reminded of the importance of observing punctuality.

Table 5.2: Gender of Registration Officials

<i>Question</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Was a registration officer male or female?	308 (50)	306 (50)	614 (100)

NEC was conscious of gender in recruitment. There were almost a balanced number of men and women among the registration officials (See Table 5.2). Reports show that most of the BVR Kit Operators were men. Women were mostly assistant registration officers.

5.2 Adequacy of Registration Materials

TEMCO found out that registration materials were adequate with the exception of a few voter registration centres where some materials were missing (See Table 5.3). Registration centres were appropriately equipped and had a BVR Kit and registration application forms. However, TEMCO observed that many Voter Registration Centres (79 percent) did not have back-up BVR Kits (see Table 5.3).

In some voters' registration centres TEMCO observed that there were no adequate arrangements made for cleanliness, chairs, tables, toilets, electricity and other necessary facilities needed for the smooth running of an exercise like this which brings together many people.

Table 5.3: Availability of Registration Materials

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Did the registration centre have a BVR Kit?	614 (100)	0 (0)	614 (100)
Did the registration centre have a back-up BVR Kit?	127 (21)	487 (79)	614 (100)
Did the registration centre have registration application forms	606 (99)	8 (1)	614 100

Table 5.4 Comparison of Availability of Back-up BVR Kits across Zones

<i>Did the registration centre have a back-up BVR Kit?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	127 (21)	487 (79)	614 (100)
Central Zone	2 (6)	33 (94)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	57 (25)	172 (75)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	32 (20)	129 (80)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	19 (16)	100 (84)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	17 (24)	53 (76)	70 (100)

Table 5.5 shows availability and condition of cameras which were present and working.

Table 5.5: Availability and Condition of Cameras

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes, working (%)</i>	<i>Yes, not working (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Did a registration centre have a camera?	611 (100)	3 (0)	0 (0)	614 (100)

5.3 Security Arrangements

Security is of paramount importance in an exercise of national interest such as voter registration. It was important that peace, tranquillity and order be maintained throughout the duration of registration. TEMCO observation found out that almost everybody who was in the voter registration centre was an authorized person (See Table 5.6). As depicted in Table 5.7, absence of uniformed security personnel was reported in over 98 per cent, i.e. 606 out of 614 observed registration centers. Startlingly, none of the TEMCO observers who were deployed in the three regions of the Southern Zone (Lindi, Mtwara and Ruvuma) spotted uniformed security personnel stationed at registration centers. One would have expected security personnel posted in the registration centers of the border regions, especially Mtwara and Ruvuma where foreign nationals frequently cross national frontiers and interact regularly with local residents.

Table 5.6: Whether unauthorized people were allowed into registration centres

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Was there any unauthorized person present at the registration centre during set up?	3 (0)	611 (100)	614 (100)

Table: 5.7: Presence of Security Personnel

<i>Were there uniformed security personnel stationed at the registration centre?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	12 (2)	602 (98)	614 (100)
Central Zone	1 (3)	34 (97)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	4 (2)	225 (98)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	0 (0)	161 (100)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	4 (3)	115 (97)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	3 (4)	67 (96)	70 (100)

5.4 Efficiency of Registration Officials

TEMCO wanted to establish if voter registration officials were competent to carry out the exercise in an efficient and professional manner. Among other things, TEMCO established the time it took to register one voter and compared it with the trend in other registration centres. Duration of registration varied, in some cases taking as little as five minutes and in some cases up to 20 minutes.

Performance of BVR Kit operators was adequate in 94 percent of all the observed centres on average. Highest performance was observed in Zanzibar where all 70 voter registration centres observed had very competent officials (see Table 5.8). This is attributed to the recruitment of competent people and adequacy of the training of registration officials. In one of the registration centres in Njombe, the BVR Kit Operator was on the phone frequently seemingly trying to rescue another BVR Kit Operator who was facing technical difficulties with the machines.

In many cases, in the first days BVR Kit operators were slow but as registration progressed they became familiar with the machines and the speed increased. Those with experience of working in similar exercises in the past were more efficient, knowledgeable and were much faster than those who were participating for the first time. Registration officials in Unguja South could not write properly names of people from Tanzania Mainland who were in Zanzibar and who wanted to register. It led to delays in registration as some were requested to write their names in a piece of paper, and even then, some names were still misspelt.

Table 5.8: Efficiency in operating the BVR Kits

<i>Did NEC registration officials appear to know how to operate BVR Kits?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	576 (94)	38 (6)	614 (100)
Central Zone	35 (100)	0 (0)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	224 (98)	5 (2)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	146 (91)	15 (9)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	101 (85)	18 (15)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	70 (100)	0 (0)	70 (100)

5.5 Performance of the BVR Kits and Actual Registration of Voters

TEMCO observed the performance of BVR Kits to find out if there were any frequent breakdowns which could affect the quality of the voter registration exercise and potentially disenfranchise potential voters. At this stage, TEMCO also observed the actual

registration of voters. TEMCO wanted to know how registration officials handled people who were registering themselves in the PNVR.

As shown in Table 5.9, in 137 registration centres (22 percent) BVR Kit breakdowns was observed. The Central Zone experienced more frequent breakdowns of BVR Kits than other zones with 29 percent of all cases compared to Zanzibar, which had the least cases of downtime (14 percent). Downtime varied from a few minutes to several hours. In some cases, as it was observed in Namtumbo there were few IT experts who were stationed at the headquarters such that it took them several hours to travel to remote registration centres to troubleshoot problems. At Skuli ya Finya Registration Centre, on 4th January 2020, the BVR machine failed to operate due to low voltage. Recharging had to be done in Wete as there was no back-up BVR Kit and efforts to communicate with the district headquarters failed.

Table 5.9: Frequency of Breakdowns of BVR Kits

<i>At any time did the BVR Kit breakdown or fail to function?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	137 (22)	477 (78)	614 (100)
Central Zone	10 (29)	25 (71)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	54 (24)	175 (76)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	38 (24)	123 (76)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	25 (21)	94 (79)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	10 (14)	60 (86)	70 (100)

TEMCO observed that almost half of the registered voters (46 percent) were not asked to provide any proof of eligibility before they were registered (see Table 5.10). More voters were asked to show proof of eligibility in Zanzibar (83 percent) than the rest of Tanzania (43 percent). In Zanzibar Shehas were present in every registration centre. Their formal role was to ascertain residence of the aspirant voters.

It was observed rather strangely that in some registration centres in Mbeya, registration officials turned away anybody who came to register wearing a round collar t-shirt. It was not immediately clear where this instruction came from as it did not appear to be a requirement in other registration centres.

Table 5.10: Proof of Eligibility to Register

<i>Was every applicant asked to show proof of his/her eligibility to register?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	262 (43)	282 (46)	614 (100)
Central Zone	19 (54)	16 (46)	35 (100)

Coastal Zone	120 (52)	109 (48)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	70 (43)	91 (57)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	53 (45)	66 (55)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	58 (83)	12 (17)	70 (100)

There appears to have been many cases of lost or defaced voter's card. As shown in Table 5.11, 88 percent of observed voters' registration centres reported this problem. Most cases were observed in the Southern and Southern Highlands Zones (98 and 97 percent, respectively) and whilst Zanzibar had the least reported cases (41 percent).

Table 5.11: Cases of Lost Voters' Identification Cards

<i>Were there any cases of lost, destroyed or defaced voter's cards reported to the registration centre?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	541 (88)	73 (12)	614 (100)
Central Zone	32 (91)	3 (9)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	206 (90)	23 (10)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	158 (98)	3 (2)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	116 (97)	3 (3)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	29 (41)	41 (59)	70 (100)

Generally, TEMCO observed that nobody was allowed to register other people on their behalf (See Table 5.12).

Table 5.12: Registration on behalf of Somebody else

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Was anyone allowed to register on behalf of someone other than themselves?	1 (0)	613 (100)	614 (100)

Generally, the registration exercise in most of the centres observed by TEMCO went on peacefully. Only eight centres had issues related to intimidation and harassment (see Table 5.13). The eight incidences of intimidation and harassment were reported in Kinondoni MC (once); Temeke MC (three times); Kibaha Mji (once); Tanga Jiji (once) and Mbeya DC (twice). Some of the incidences as narrated by TEMCO observers include:

- a) Kinondoni MC: One applicant forcefully grabbed a wrongly filled registration form from the RO who had wanted to retain it as evidence that it had been used but incorrectly. Calmness returned after the ARO Kata arrived and threatened to call the police.
- b) Temeke MC: People queuing up for registration were irked by officers working in one of the WEOs offices, who uncharacteristically acted as registration officials,

and started giving preference to people they knew instead of those who had lined up for registration.

- c) Kibaha Mji: Three youths from a neighbouring ward (Kwa Mfipa Ward) were turned away by the WEO and CCM agent and were asked to submit letters confirming their places of domicile. They refused and instead started lashing out with harsh words at the WEO and the CCM agent. Apparently, there were long queues in the Kwa Mfipa Ward.
- d) Tanga Jiji: Having been asked to provide his personal details one registering voter became hostile at the BVR Kit Operator, lashing out with offensive words, expressing his displeasure at being questioned.
- e) Mbeya DC: A BVR Kit Operator was too emotional and uncooperative to everyone's liking, particularly to the people waiting to have their details taken for registration. The operator provided snappy and rather nasty responses.

Table 5.13: Intimidation and Harassment

<i>At any time did anyone attempt to intimidate, harass, or harm registration officials, applicants, representatives of political parties or observers?</i>			
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Tanzania	8 (1)	606 (99)	614 (100)
Central Zone	0 (0)	35 (100)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	6 (3)	223 (99)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	0 (0)	161 (100)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	2 (2)	117 (98)	119 (100)
Zanzibar Zone	0 (100)	70 (100)	70 (100)

Incidences of suspension of registration were rare and only observed in 79 of the registration centres observed (13 percent) (see Table 5.14). When compared across zones we see that Coastal Zone had more incidences of suspension of voter registration followed by the Southern Zone. These incidences can be grouped into three categories as follows:

- a) Breakdowns of BVR Kits:
 - Malfunctioning of cameras and printers;
 - Shortage of ink/toner;
 - BVR Kit running out of charge.
- b) Shortages of registration application forms (especially Form No. 1) and voters' registration cards; and
- c) BVR Kit Operator being temporarily absent or unable to discharge duties:

- One BVR Kit Operator took advantage of the proximity of the registration centre to his residence to go for lunch (instead of ordering the same to be brought to him);
- Another BVR Kit Operator went to the Mosque for Friday prayers;
- One registration officer suddenly fell sick leading to suspension of registration. The registration exercise resumed after she felt better.

Table 5.14: Suspension of voter registration

<i>Was registration suspended at any time during the day?</i>	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Tanzania	79 (13)	535 (85)	614 (100)
Central Zone	6 (17)	29 (83)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	21 (9)	208 (91)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	19 (12)	142 (88)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	16 (13)	103 (94)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	17 (24)	53 (76)	70 (100)

5.6 Location and Accessibility of Registration Centres

In ensuring success of voter registration NEC has to take into consideration security of persons and equipment and, accessibility of registration centers as well as their acceptability. As such registration is required by law to be conducted in public buildings.

Table 5.15 shows that most of the voters' registration centres (558 or 91 percent) were appropriately located in public buildings. Where public buildings could not be found or were inadequate, NEC used makeshift centres. TEMCO witnessed 29 such makeshift structures (5 percent). These were mostly special tents provided by NEC and erected in specially selected areas. Overall in Zanzibar, all voters' registration centres were in public buildings. The Coastal Zone had more cases of observed makeshift centres than the rest of zones.

Table 5.15: Location of Registration Centres

<i>What kind of venue was the registration centre located?</i>	<i>Public building (%)</i>	<i>Place of worship (%)</i>	<i>Makeshift structure (%)</i>	<i>Other (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	558(91)	1 (0)	29 (5)	26 (4)	614(100)
Central Zone	32 (91)	1 (3)	1 (3)	1 (3)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	205 (90)	0 (0)	10 (4)	14 (6)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	146 (91)	0 (0)	6 (4)	9 (6)	161(100)

Southern Highlands Zone	105 (88)	0 (0)	12 (10)	2 (2)	395 (100)
Zanzibar	70 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	70 (100)

Some registration centres were faced with challenges such as flooding when it rained heavily as it happened at *Itensa Dispensary* in Mbeya on 8th December 2019. This situation forced the WEO to pick up registration officers and registration materials in her car after the registration exercise had closed at six in the evening.



In the left photo: Itensa Dispensary registration, before it started raining and at the right photo the same center surrounded by rainwater at around five in the evening. Mbeya City Council, December 8th, 2019.

The “Kwa Mzee Mwasanga” registration center, in Nkuyu hamlet is one example of a makeshift structure used by NEC for voter registration. When it rained heavily with strong winds, it threatened to carry away the constructed tent due to the fact that the people who erected the tent did not use nails to firmly fix it. After the rains had stopped, the tent was surrounded by mud, causing hardships to registration officers and registering voters. Safety of the registration materials was also jeopardised.



Assistant registration officer takes details of a citizen applying for new voter ID and BVR Kit Operator takes a photo of one of the citizens who turned up for registering in the permanent voters' register; Right photo inside a makeshift Kwa Mzee Mwasanga registration center with a muddy floor after a heavy downpour, Nkuyu street, Iganzo ward, Mbeya City Council December 11th, 2019.





Rains also caused difficulties in movement of personnel and materials as observed in the above photos from Kilindi DC.



Registration officers in Kilosa DC making efforts to reach a registration center following a heavy downpour.

The buildings are not generally meant for registration of voters and therefore in some cases registration took place in the verandas or as in the case of dispensaries, an empty ward. In addition, some public buildings were constructed in the past when regulations regarding accessibility, especially for people with disabilities were not in place. As shown in Table 5.16, only 50 percent of registration centres observed were completely accessible to people with disabilities.

Table 5.16: Accessibility of Registration Centres

Is the registration centre accessible for persons with disabilities?	<i>Completely (%)</i>	<i>Somewhat (%)</i>	<i>Not (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	310 (50)	228 (37)	76 (12)	614 (100)
Central Zone	9 (26)	24 (69)	2 (6)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	82 (36)	82 (36)	2 (6)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	96 (60)	46 (29)	19 (12)	161 (100)
Southern Highlands Zone	73 (61)	39 (33)	7 (6)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	50 (71)	19 (27)	1 (1)	70 (100)



Some registration centres as this one in Mtwara Mikindani proved to be inaccessible to people with disabilities.

5.7 Participation of Political Parties

As key stakeholders', participation of political parties is crucial for the success and credibility of any electoral process. As such the law allows political parties to place their agents in registration centres if they wish. Table 5.17 shows that political parties placed very few party agents and sparingly. Only four political parties had agents in registration centres including CCM which had agents in 262 centres (43 percent), ACT-Wazalendo in 56 centres (9 percent), CUF in 20 centres (3 percent) and CHADEMA in 30 centres (5 percent).

Table 5.17: Political party agents present in registration centres

<i>Which political parties had agents present at the registration centre? (Tick all that apply)</i>	<i>No party agent (%)</i>	<i>CCM (%)</i>	<i>CHADEMA (%)</i>	<i>CUF (%)</i>	<i>ACT-Wazale ndo (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	340 (55)	262(43)	30 (5)	20(3)	56(9)	614(100)
Central Zone	34 (97)	1 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	77 (34)	151 (66)	14 (6)	1 (0)	1 (0)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	133 (83)	28 (17)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	161 (100)
Southern Highland Zone	88 (74)	31 (26)	4 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	8 (11)	51 (73)	12 (17)	19(27)	54 (77)	70 (100)

5.8 Cooperation with TEMCO Observers

Electoral rules and regulations require that election observers be accredited and accorded cooperation by election officials so that they can carry out their activities. As shown in Table 5.18 TEMCO observers enjoyed excellent cooperation from NEC officials in registration centres and all were allowed to observe voter registration.

Table 5.18: Obstruction or prevention to observe

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
At any time were you obstructed/ prevented from observing registration, including being withheld key information about the process?	2 (0)	612 (100)	614 (100)
Did you witness any non-TEMCO observers or party agents being obstructed or prevented from observing registration?	1 (0)	613 (100)	614 (100)

5.9 Closing of the Registration Centres

Voter registration centres were required to close at 6 p.m. if all who arrived before had been registered. In many centres observed this was the case. However, there were cases of early or late closing. TEMCO observed that 14 voter registration centres closed before 6.00 pm (Table 5.19). One of the instances where this was observed is Unguja South where the Sheha in one of the registration centres stopped people from registration at 4.00 pm. He claimed that it was a normal practice to allow registration officials to complete registration of people who were on the queue and then get time to balance their data.

Table 5.19: Closing time of registration centres

<i>Did the registration centre close for the day before 6 pm?</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Tanzania	21 (3)	593 (97)	614 (100)
Central Zone	0 (0)	35 (100)	35 (100)
Coastal Zone	8 (3)	221 (97)	229 (100)
Southern Zone	2 (1)	159 (98)	161 (100)
Southern Highland Zone	2 (2)	117 (98)	119 (100)
Zanzibar	9 (35)	61 (87)	70 (100)

As shown in Table 5.20 registration materials were handled carefully after the end of each registration day.

Table 5.20: Safe keeping of registration materials

<i>Question</i>	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
Were all of the registration materials packed away for safe keeping at the end of the day?	606 (99)	8 (1)	614(100)

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusion

For the most part the voter registration exercise was carried out successfully in the 89 LGAs that TEMCO observed. Notwithstanding the observed shortcomings, NEC had made all the necessary logistical arrangements, including the preparation of the schedule for staggered registration throughout the country. In most cases, registration materials and equipment were adequate and deployed in a timely manner. Recruitment, training and deployment of registration officers was done to the satisfaction of many stakeholders, including TEMCO.

Voter education was overwhelmingly provided by NEC. Other stakeholders, including CSOs and political parties, did not feature significantly in providing voters' education. This enormous task seemed to have placed a heavy burden on NEC. Use of social media proved popular and effective. The public address vans and posters were two of the most common strategies used to disseminate voter education. These had shortcomings and in some cases it was clear that the message had not been communicated effectively. TEMCO observed cases where prospective voters had to seek clarification from registration officials, and thus, adding pressure on their already limited time.

IT technicians played a very good role in ensuring that all the BVR Kits operated optimally. They were also ready and available to sort out any technical problems with the registration equipment whenever they happened. However, due to frequent breakdowns at a few centres, they were at times not able to cover multiple centres simultaneously, causing delays or temporary suspensions. The most recurring issue noted by TEMCO observers was that of technical problems with the functioning of the BVR package, that is, the BVR kit, printer, computer and camera. Among all issues reported by observers as critical on daily basis, at least one of them had to do with technicalities in the operation and functioning of one of the BVR gadgets. Frequent breakdown of BVR machines, printers and cameras as well as malfunction of the computer, are incidences observed in a few registration centers, and this normally culminated into suspension of the registration exercise. In areas where the suspension was extended to more than one hour, some applicants for registration left unregistered and there was no guarantee that they could turn up for registration the following day.

There were a few incidences of shortage and/or late deployment of critical registration materials in observed LGAs and their respective registration centers. Unavailability of enough registration application forms, absence of back up BVR kits, shortage of toner as well as cards for printing out voter IDs were also reported. In Zanzibar, TEMCO observed late delivery of registration materials ferried by boat from the Mainland. Clearance logistics to allow for their passage at the Zanzibar port resulted in delays in the opening of the registration centers. Perhaps the most notable incidence in this regard was the late deployment of key registration materials from NEC to Njombe and Ruvuma regions, leading to the adjournment of the exercise by two days.

Absence of security personnel was conspicuous. Although there were no reported incidences of violence to necessitate intervention from security organs, nevertheless, the importance of having such national exercises secured remains crucial. It is, therefore, a challenge to NEC and the Government to make sure that in future registration processes and other electoral exercises are provided with fully-fledged security, by deploying at least a security officer at each center.

6.2 Recommendations

TEMCO would like to accompany this interim statement with recommendations that might help in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the voter registration exercise in the future:

- (i) Scaling up of voter education by increasing use of community radio programmes in a good time ahead of the actual registration exercise to ensure

- that information reaches as many people as possible. Other methods especially the use of newspapers, social media and opinion and religious leaders can be useful in this aspect.
- (ii) Increase provision as well as visibility of voters' education programmes tailored to special groups, i.e. women, youths and PWDs. Efforts by NEC, LGAs, CSOs, political parties and other stakeholders to sensitize communities to ensure that they are well-informed, ready, willing and able to fully participate in the electoral process ought to consider also interests of the aforementioned special groups but more prominently women and PWDS.
 - (iii) As far as the national civic education is concerned, to which voters' education is part, there is need to provide clarity on issues related to accrediting authority, criteria for selection of providers, funding and control measures for quality assurance.
 - (iv) Increasing the number of IT experts to ensure that each one is assigned a manageable number of voter registration centres.
 - (v) It remains a challenge to the Commission to call upon the CSOs that were accredited to provide civic education during the registration process to do so.
 - (vi) Engage and remind political parties to place more party agents in voter registration centres.
 - (vii) Deployment of security personnel in the voter registration centres to ensure safety, order and tranquility.
 - (viii) Availability of more back-up BVR Kits. This will completely reduce a few complaints of people waiting for a long time in cases of malfunctioning or down time.
 - (ix) Given the huge reported cases of lost and defaced voters' cards NEC should intensify and direct its awareness campaign to registered voters to ensure safe custody of the voters' identity cards. Registered voters should make sure that their voters' identity cards are not spoiled, lost or rather taken from them unscrupulously.
 - (x) Women, the elderly and PWDS should be given priority at registration centres.
 - (xi) Calling upon NEC to strengthen its communication strategy in order to ensure timely sharing of important information, decisions and updates on matters related to the electoral process. TEMCO acknowledges marked improvement in NEC's communication strategy via regular updating of its website, blog, social media platforms like Instagram, NEC online TV on YouTube and press conferences, but unfortunately was not informed in good time about changes to the registration timetables, for example for Zanzibar and parts of Morogoro and extension of the registration period for Dar es Salaam, so it could not

adjust deployment of its observers who had already been posted to their assigned LGAs.

APPENDIX I: COVERAGE OF TEMCO OBSERVATION

ZONES	REGIONS	LGAs
Central	Dodoma	Chamwino DC
		Dodoma Jiji
		Bahi DC
		Kongwa DC
		Mpwapwa DC
Southern Highlands	Mbeya	Kyela DC
		Mbeya DC
		Mbeya Jiji
		Busokelo DC
		Chunya DC
		Mbarali DC
		Rungwe DC
	Iringa	Mufindi DC
		Mafinga Mji
		Kilolo DC
		Iringa DC
		Iringa MC
	Njombe	Njombe DC
		Njombe Mji
		Makambako Mji
		Ludewa DC
		Wanging'ombe DC
Southern	Ruvuma	Namtumbo DC
		Mbinga DC
		Mbinga Mji
		Nyasa DC
		Tunduru DC
		Songea MC
		Madaba DC
		Songea DC

	Lindi	Nachingwea DC
		Ruangwa DC
		Liwale DC
		Lindi MC
		Lindi DC
		Kilwa DC
	Mtwara	Newala DC
		Newala TC
		Nanyumbu DC
		Mtwara MC
		Mtwara DC
		Nanyamba Mji
		Masasi DC
		Masasi Mji
		Tandahimba DC
Coastal	Dar es Salaam	Kinondoni MC
		Ilala Jiji
		Ilala MC
		Temeke MC
		Kigamboni MC
		Ubungo MC
	Pwani	Bagamoyo DC
		Chalinze DC
		Mkuranga DC
		Rufiji DC
		Mafia DC
		Kibaha DC
		Kibaha Mji
		Kisarawe DC
		Kibiti DC
	Morogoro	Gairo DC
		Kilombero DC

		Mvomero DC
		Morogoro DC
		Morogoro MC
		Kilosa DC
		Ifakara Mji
		Ulanga DC
		Malinyi DC
	Tanga	Tanga Jiji
		Muheza DC
		Mkinga DC
		Pangani DC
		Handeni DC
		Korogwe DC
		Kilindi DC
		Lushoto DC
		Bumbuli DC
Zanzibar	Kaskazini Unguja	Mjini Magharibi 'A'
		Mjini Kaskazini 'B'
	Kusini Unguja	Kusini
	Mjini Magharibi	Mjini
		Mjini Magharibi
		Kati
	Kaskazini Pemba	Wete
		Micheweni
	Kusini Pemba	Chake Chake
		Mkoani